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NOTE
WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. DUKES:

TAMING "TOO BIG TO FAIL"' CLASSES IN THE BATTLE
AGAINST BLACKMAIL ACTIONS AND FRIVOLOUS
LITIGATION
Catherine R. Hecker"
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine you run a chain of grocery stores in a large Southern state. You
have approximately 3,000 store locations in this state, and the state has fifty
counties. Each store employs an average of more than 400 employees. One
store employee in a mid-sized store complains of discrimination against her
by one of the managers and files a lawsuit against you and your statewide
grocery chain. In thirty-six different counties, at least one employee alleges
that she has experienced discrimination at the hands of her local store
management. While the allegations of discrimination occur on a case-bycase basis, many of these allegations are legitimate and are supported by
expert testimony and anecdotal reports. You are an equal opportunity
employer with a stated anti-discrimination employment policy. All fifty
counties, including the fourteen counties with no allegations of
discrimination, have banded together to bring suit against you as the
employer. Do the employees in the fourteen counties with no allegations of
discrimination have the right to sue you? Should thousands of employees in
a county have the right to sue you if only one person in that county has
alleged discrimination?
t The author decided to use the term coined from government bailouts of various
corporations and financial institutions under the reasoning that, should these massive
institutions fail, the whole of society would suffer. The author analogizes this term, and
undoubtedly stretches this term, to certain class actions that become so large and foreboding
that, regardless of the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, defendants' best option is to just pay
them off rather than to endure lengthy and costly litigation. For an interesting article on the
"bigness" of class actions, see Alexandra D. Lahav, The Curse of Bigness and the Optimal Size
of Class Actions, 63 VAND. L. REv. EN BANC 117, 118 (2010).
tt Articles and Book Reviews Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 7. J.D.
Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2013); B.A., Secondary Education, Hyles
Anderson College (2009). I would like to thank my mother, Sarah, and my husband, Rick,
for all of their love and support-I owe so much to the both of them. Also, I'd like to say
thank you to the Liberty University Law Review for helping me learn and grow as a law
student and a writer.
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Alone, each employee has limited resources to pursue a lawsuit against
your corporation-they are weak, you are strong, and the litigation will
likely drain them and produce minimal results. Many times in cases like
this, individual instances of discrimination go unchecked because of the
sheer cost of asserting one's rights in court. Once banded together, however,
these employees from the fifty counties pose a formidable courtroom threat
of billions of dollars in damages to your business, regardless of whether the
employees' claims actually have merit. In a lawsuit like this, you may never
know if the claims of discrimination are legitimate because you will
certainly be forced to settle before trial. What is the just outcome in a
scenario like this?
This Note focuses on the seminal United States Supreme Court case
articulating support for a heightened standard of Rule 23(a)(2) class action
commonality: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes ("Wal-Mart v. Dukes").' In
Part II, this Note examines the history of class action litigation and the
background and holding of Wal-Mart v. Dukes.2 In Part III, this Note
analyzes what benefits and detriments Wal-Mart v. Dukes may have for
future class action litigation within the categories of class action suits most
commonly brought.3 Lastly, in Part IV, this Note reflects on the standard for
Rule 23(a)(2) commonality and individualized monetary damages as stated
in Wal-Mart v. Dukes and considers whether these standards will have a
substantial effect on categories of future class action litigation.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Class Action Litigation
The class action lawsuit permits large groups of individuals to become a
single litigative entity and seek a collective legal remedy. One or more class
representatives litigate these individuals' interests, and all members are
bound by the results of the litigation.' While class actions are heavily
criticized for inequities, such as "sweetheart settlements" and "blackmail
1. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. The focus of this Note is not to probe the merits of the case any further than what is
appropriate at the stage of class action certification, but instead to delve into the why and
how of the legal standard for commonality articulated in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.
3. The five categories of class actions this Note seeks to examine in light of Wal-Mart v.
Dukes are Title VII, mass tort, securities, antitrust, and labor class actions.
4.

See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL,

ACTION 1(1987).

FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
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settlements,"' they also provide legal recourse for claimants with small
monetary claims or limited financial resources because the class action
pools the resources of other claimants with similar injuries.6 In these
instances, to recognize individual litigants as a single litigative entity is to
7
grant them a greater form of power than the individuals possessed alone.
Since the beginning of American class action litigation, courts have
struggled to fairly allocate the bargaining power between the classes and the
parties opposing them.
B. History of Modern Class Action Litigation
Modern American class action litigation can be traced back to the
nineteenth century, particularly to Justice Joseph Story's opinions and
treatises on group litigation.! At that time, the class action vehicle was used
sparingly and was suitable only for equity actions where litigants shared a
common interest in having the court issue an injunction.9 Not until 1937
did the United States Supreme Court officially set out the procedural
guidelines for federal class representation established in the original Rule
23."o It was the original Rule 23 that first permitted litigants to recover
damages in a class action." Many terms in the original Rule 23 proved to be
obscure and uncertain-Rule 23 did not squarely address any notice
requirements to non-parties and did not clearly assert the extent to which
judgments were binding. 2 Then, in 1966, the Supreme Court approved the
revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which resulted in a major
5. David Rosenberg, The Regulatory Advantage of Class Action, in REGULATION
(W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (defining "sweetheart settlements" as
settlements in which class counsel compromises the class members' interests in settling a
meritorious claim for far less than it is worth, and "blackmail settlements" as settlements in
which the class counsel threatens costly class action litigation, forcing the defendant to settle
the claim for far more than it is actually worth).
6. YEAZELL, supra note 4, at 10-11; see also MARGARET C. JASPER, YOUR RIGHTS IN A
CLASS ACTION SUIT 2-3 (2005) (providing a hypothetical scenario of a claimant monetary
situation that exemplifies why class action suits aggregate many claims).
THROUGH LITIGATION 29799

7. YEAZELL, supra note 4, at 10-11.

8. Id. at 220-21.
9. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751, at 12

(3d ed. 2005).
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note, 1937 Adoption, subdiv. (a).
11. Id.
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note, 1966 Amendment; 39 F.R.D.
69, 99 (1966).
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overhaul of Rule 23 requirements1 3- the "true," "hybrid," and "spurious"
class distinctions that the courts read into original Rule 23 were eliminated
and replaced with new categories for litigation. 4 Specifically, to achieve
class certification, the revised Rule 23 mandates two requirements: all four
of the Rule 23(a) requirements and at least one of the Rule 23(b) class
categories must be met by the plaintiff class seeking certification." The Rule
23(a) and (b) requirements are laid out in the following chart:'"
Plaintiff seeking certificatioin of Plaintiff Class must:
1.Meet all Rule 23(a) requirements:

(a)(1) - Numerosity Class is so numerous that Joinder is impracticable
(a)(2) - Commonality - rhere are questions of law or fact common to the class.
- Typicality - Representative's claims are typical of dhwclass'claims.

ASM 1(a)(3)

(a)(4) - Adequacy - Representative will fairly and adequately protect the casitrss

[I After satisfying Rule 23(a), aclass

(b)(1) Adjudication by individual class members would create risk of:
(a) - Inconsistent or varying aidiudications that would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the defendant;or
(b)- Adiudications that are dispositive of the interests of other members not parties
to the adjudications or that substantially impair or impede other members' ability to
protect their interests.

acion maybe maintained i at hvt
one Rule 23(b) category is met:

OR

(b)(2) - Defendants' actions apply generally to the class so that injunctive or declaratory
relidfis appropriate for tiw,whole

class.I

(b)(3) - Questions of law or fact common to class nwinber; predominate over question
affecting only individual members and a cass action is the superior method for fairly
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

First, for a class to achieve certification in federal court, it must clear the
hurdles of Rule 23(a): numerosity," commonality,'" typicality," and
adequacy.2 0 If any one of the Rule 23(a) hurdles is not cleared, class
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note, 1966 Amendment.
14. Id.; see also 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, §§ 1752-53.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) & (b).
16. The chart is the author's own creation and is a flowchart of how to approach Federal
Rule 23(a) and (b) for class action certification. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a) & (b).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable").
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring that "there are questions of law or fact common to
the class").
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) (requiring that "the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class").
20. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring that "the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class").
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certification will be denied automatically. 2' This Note focuses on the
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) because Rule 23(a) commonality
was the "crux" of Wal-Mart v. Dukes.22 A class meets Rule 23(a)(2)'s
standard for commonality when "there are questions of law or fact common
to the class."2 3 In the employment discrimination class action case General
Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,24 the Supreme Court held that a
rigorous analysis must be conducted to ensure that the Rule 23
requirements are met.25 Post-Falcon, the circuits have varied on the Rule
23(a)(2) commonality requirement-some circuits have liberally construed
commonality to be sufficient so long as the proposed class contains some
common question of law or fact,26 while other circuits have adopted a more
difficult standard for what is sufficient as a common question of law or
fact. 27 The varying Rule 23(a)(2) standards throughout the circuits added

21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (stating that a class action categorized under Rule 23(b) cannot
be maintained if all portions of Rule 23(a) are not satisfied).
22. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2011).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
24. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
25. Id. at 160-61 ("[A] Title VII class action, like any other class action, may only be
certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule
23(a) have been satisfied.").
26. See Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that the
commonality requirement is applied "permissively"); Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568
F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that the commonality requirement is a "low
hurdle"); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.
2008) (stating that the commonality requirement is a "low bar"); Mullen v. Treasure Chest
Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the test for commonality is "not
demanding"); Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that
commonality is "easily met"); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir.
1986) (holding that the "threshold of 'commonality' is not high"); Pichler v. UNITE, 228
F.R.D. 230, 249 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that the "commonality threshold is relatively low");
Int'l Molders' & Allied Workers' Local 164 v. Nelson, 102 F.R.D. 457, 463 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(stating that the Ninth Circuit's standard for Rule(a)(2) commonality is a relaxed standard).
27. See Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding
that this rigorous analysis may include a preliminary inquiry into the merits); Trevizo v.
Adams, 455 F.3d 1155, 1163 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding a rigorous analysis standard for
commonality and that the trial court did not abuse discretion in finding lack of
commonality); see also Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Reeb v.
Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 640 (6th Cir. 2006); Cooper v. Southern Co., 390
F.3d 695, 712 (11th Cir. 2004), overruled on othergrounds, Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S.
454, 457 (2006); J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999).
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another facet of risk to the class action process; Wal-Mart v. Dukes sought
to clarify this commonality ambiguity.2 8
Rule 23(a) requirements are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a
class action.29 In addition to fulfilling Rule 23(a), classes seeking
certification must fall into one of the Rule 23(b) categories. 30 Generally,
Rule 23(b)(1) stipulates that if there are inconsistent or varying
adjudications, or if res judicata against non-parties would result from
individual litigation, then a Rule 23(b)(1) class certification is appropriate.3'
Rule 23(b)(2) applies to situations in which the defendant has treated the
members of the class in an unlawful way so as to warrant an injunction or
declaratory relief as a remedy. 32 In Rule 23(b)(2) class litigation, money
damages may be awarded in addition to an injunction or declaratory relief
so long as the money damages are incidental.33 Last of all, Rule 23(b)(3)
functions like a "catch-all" category for all other types of class action
litigation." Rule 23(b)(3) requires (1) that the questions of law or fact
common to class members must predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and (2) that the class action is superior to other
methods available to fairly and efficiently adjudicate the controversy.
While the main focus of this Note is Rule 23(a) and (b), when
considering the dynamics of class action lawsuits, it is beneficial to consider
Rule 23(f) and the reasons for its adoption in 1998. Rule 23(f) states that the
"court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting ... classaction certification under this rule."36 Because of the number of participants
and the potential for large settlements, class action lawsuits are costly,
28. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550-51.
29. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note, 1966 Amendment, subdiv. (a); 39
F.R.D. 69, 100 (1966).
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) & (b).
31. See FED. R. CI. P. 23(b)(1)(A), (B).
32. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
33. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2544 (stating that claims for money damages could be certified
as part of a (b)(2) class as long as those claims did not predominate over the requests for
declaratory and injunctive relief). Wal-Mart v. Dukes also stipulates that the monetary
damages may not be individualized. Id. at 2557. This will be discussed at greater length in
Part II.C.1.b.
34. Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L.
REv. 813, 816 (2004) ("Because 23(b)(3) is a kind of 'catch-all' for more ambiguous class
claims, the Rule imposes a number of additional procedural hurdles on the 23(b)(3) class.").
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
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burdensome, and risky for both plaintiffs and defendants." Prior to the
addition of Rule 23(f), if a class achieved certification in the district court,
then many defendants were especially eager to settle." Similarly, if a
plaintiff class was denied certification, it was forced to seek appellate review
"by proceeding to final judgment on the merits of an individual claim that,
standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of litigation."" Class
certification is a powerful event for plaintiffs, and in many cases it is a
means to settlement; consequently, the Advisory Committee and Supreme
Court deemed Rule 23(f) necessary to prevent the inequities that stem from
a non-appealable decision of class certification.40 To quote one class action
scholar, "express authorization for appeals of class certification
determinations .. .stands as recognition that certification is no mere
preliminary, procedural ruling.""
C. The History of Wal-Mart v. Dukes
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart") is the largest private employer in
America and is comprised of 3,400 stores that employ more than one
million people.4 2 Pay and promotions at Wal-Mart are delegated to the local
managers and exercised in a subjective manner within certain pre-set
ranges.43 Wal-Mart does have certain objective criteria for promotion
opportunities, but once objective factors are met, promotions are left to the
local managers's subjective discretion. The crux of the plaintiffs's class
action claim is Wal-Mart's corporate practice of deferring employment
decisions to local managers.

37. See Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 297.
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note, 1998 Amendments, subdiv. (f). The
Advisory Committee Notes state that granting certification may force a defendant to settle
rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous
liability. Id.
39. Id. (positing that wrongful denial of a class certification and consequent litigation
merely to access the courts of appeals is a harsh burden for an individual claimant to bear).
40. Id.
41. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof,84 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 97,98-99 (2009).
42. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2546 (2011).
43. Id. at 2547.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 2548.
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The plaintiff class seeking certification consists of approximately 1.5
million women; the class is represented by former and current Wal-Mart
employees Betty Dukes, Christine Kwapnoski, and Edith Arana.46 Betty
Dukes has been an employee of Wal-Mart since 1994 and claimed that she
was paid less than male employees with less seniority performing the same
job and that she was unjustly disciplined by local managers for making
complaints against them, while male employees were not disciplined.4 7
Christine Kwapnoski has been an employee of Wal-Mart since 198648 and
claimed that she experienced male managers who screamed at female
employees, but not male employees, and that she was told to "doll up" by
her manager. 49 Edith Arana worked at Wal-Mart from 1995 to 2001 and
claimed that she pursued promotion opportunities at Wal-Mart, but was
denied equal opportunity, and was eventually fired because of her sex.so
In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the plaintiff class brought an employment
discrimination action alleging that company-wide policies of discrimination
resulted in a disparity in compensation and promotions between male and
female employees." The plaintiffs alleged that this policy of wide-latitude
deference had an unlawful impact on female employees and resulted in
disproportionate favor for men.52 They supported these assertions with
three forms of evidence: statistical evidence of disparities in pay and
promotion; anecdotal reports of discrimination from 120 female employees;
and expert testimony from sociologist Dr. William Bielby.53 Through
aggregated statistical findings, the plaintiffs made such assertions as,
"Women fill 70 percent of the hourly jobs in the retailer's stores but make
up only 33 percent of management employees," and "the salary gap widens
over time even for men and women hired into the same jobs at the same
time."" The 120 female Wal-Mart employees' reports of discrimination
bring to light various claims of female employees being denied promotion
46. Id. at 2547-48.
47. Id.
48.

LIzA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: THE LANDMARK BATTLE FOR WORKERS'

RIGHTS AT WAL-MART 90 (2004).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548.
Id.
Id. at 2541.
Id. at 2548.
Id. at 2549.
Id. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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opportunities, being paid less than their male counterparts, and being
humiliated at the hands of some of Wal-Mart's local managers." Through
expert testimony, the plaintiff class alleged that Wal-Mart has a strong and
uniform "corporate culture" that permits a bias against women to permeate
the decision-making of local managers. Under this rationale, all female
Wal-Mart employees in the nation have been subjected to this
discrimination and therefore sought class certification for the period
December 1998 until present."
At the trial level, the district court found that the plaintiff class
demonstrated the existence of significant legal and factual issues common
to the entire class concerning Wal-Mart's alleged company-wide
discriminatory policies" and that the monetary relief sought was incidental
to the injunctive relief sought." On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court holding, concluding that the respondents's evidence was
sufficient to raise the common question of "whether Wal-Mart's female
employees nationwide were subjected to a single set of corporate
policies ... that may have worked to unlawfully discriminate...."o
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit remanded the issue of the respondents'
backpay claims to the district court for an analysis of predominance of
monetary damages under Rule 23(b)(2)." Wal-Mart appealed to the
Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 6,

56. Id. at 2563-64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); FEATHERSTONE, supra note 48, at 2, 42, 136.
57. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2549.
58. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), affd, Dukes v.
Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), affd in part on reh'g en banc, Dukes v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
59. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141. The plaintiff class in Wal-Martv. Dukes sought "class-wide
injunctive and declaratory relief, lost pay, and punitive damages." Id. at 141. They also did
not seek compensatory damages on behalf of the class. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that punitive damages should not be included in a Rule 23(b)(2) class without
further analysis by the district court. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 622 (9th
Cir. 2010), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court dealt
with the issue of injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive damages, and backpay and noted
that the plaintiff class did not seek compensatory damages. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011).
60. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 612.
61. Id. at 621 ("On remand, the district court must determine whether certification
under Rule 23(b)(2) of the punitive damages claims would cause monetary relief to
predominate.")
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2010.62 The parties argued the case before the Supreme Court on March 29,
2011, and the Supreme Court handed down its decision on June 20, 2011.63
1. Majority Opinion in Wal-Mart v. Dukes
In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority,
stated that the plaintiff class failed certification on the basis of Rule 23(a)(2)
commonality' and violated Rule 23(b)(2) by asserting individualized claims
for backpay.s All nine of the Supreme Court justices agreed that claims for
individualized relief preclude a Rule 23(b)(2) class from certification; such
individualized relief may only be certified under Rule 23(b)(3).66 The
contention between the justices centered around the analysis of Rule
23(a)(2) commonality.
a.

Rule 23(a)(2) commonality

The standard for Rule 23(a)(2) commonality, as stated in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, is not merely "the raising of common 'questions' . . . but, rather the
capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to
drive the resolution of the litigation."" In determining the issue of
commonality, Justice Scalia relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's
decisions in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,68 Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank and Trust,"9 and InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v.

62. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010).
63. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2541.
64. Id. at 2556-57.

65. Id. at 2559. The plaintiff class's claims for backpay violated the Rule 23(b)(2)
standard because the backpay was not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief
sought. Id. at 2557; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note, 1966
Amendment, subdiv. (b)(2); 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
66. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2558.
67. Id. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda, supra note 41, at 132). A plaintiff class's
claims must depend upon a common contention.... That common

contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of
classwide resolution-which means that determination of its truth or
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the
claims in one stroke.
Id.
68. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
69. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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United States.70 He also relied upon the law review article, Class Certification
in the Age of Aggregate Proof."
(1) General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon
In Falcon, a Mexican-American employee brought a Title VII suit against
his employer, alleging discrimination in hiring and promoting; the district
court certified a class of Mexican-American employees and applicants
without conducting an evidentiary hearing.72 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the majority reversed the district court and denied class
certification.73 Speaking in the interest of the government concerning
employment discrimination litigation," the Attorney General maintained
that "[t]he commonality requirement focuses on similarity of proof."" The
Supreme Court agreed and stated that, for Rule 23(a)(2) commonality, the
plaintiff class must demonstrate that the class members have "suffered the
same injury."" The Court observed that "sometimes it may be necessary for
the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the
certification question."n In Falcon, the Court held that the class was
"across-the-board," and that such classes do not promote judicial
economy." "Across-the-board" class actions occur when the representative
plaintiff seeks certification of a class inclusive of all individuals within a
certain category merely because they fall within that category and the
representative has a claim of discrimination. When an "across-the-board"
class action is asserted, the court may adopt one of two ways to bridge the
conceptual gap between mere allegations and a meritorious Title VII action.
70. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
71. Nagareda, supra note 41.
72. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 149, 152.
73. Id. at 161.
74. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147 (1982) (No. 81-574).
75. Id. at 16 (asserting further that commonality analysis "requires an ad hoc
determination of whether the asserted claims, and the proof to be offered in support of them,
are sufficiently similar to warrant consideration in a class action.").
76. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 148.
77. Id. at 160 (stating that certification is proper if a rigorous analysis of the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites is conducted).
78. Id. at 159; see also id. at 163 (Burger, J. concurring) (stating that "across-the-board"
class actions promote "multiplication of claims and endless litigation.").
79. Id. at 148 (majority opinion) (holding that racial discrimination is, in a sense, class
discrimination but not for the purpose of class certification).

60
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The first is by bringing forth "[s]ignificant proof that an employer operated
under a general policy of discrimination.""s The second is by proving that
the employer "used a biased testing procedure to evaluate both applicants
for employment and incumbent employees."" In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the
majority adopted both of these tests from Falcon and stated that, because
neither test was met, the plaintiff class failed.82
(2) InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. United States
In Teamsters, the United States initiated Title VII litigation against a
nationwide company and a union, representing many of the company's
employees, alleging that the company had engaged in a pattern or practice
of discriminating against minority members." The Supreme Court upheld
the class certification and stated that "the Government sustained its burden
of proving that the company engaged in a systemwide pattern or practice of
employment discrimination."" The government proved that the employer
engaged in system-wide discrimination by bringing forth both statistical
evidence and individual testimony that described over forty specific
instances of discrimination. These forty accounts represented that, of all
minority employees within the company, approximately one out of every
eight alleged instances of discrimination.86 The majority in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes adopted the rationale in Teamsters." Much like the employees in
Teamsters, the plaintiff class in Wal-Mart v. Dukes produced both statistical
evidence and anecdotal employee reports of discrimination." The key
difference between the classes in these cases is that the ratio of employee
reports to members of the proposed class in Wal-Mart v. Dukes was one
report for every 12,500 class members and, thus, these reports were not
evenly spread throughout Wal-Mart's regions." Because of this disparity,
the majority held that the plaintiff class had not demonstrated that Wal80.
(2011)).
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 159 n.15 (cited by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545
Id. (cited by Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553).
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553-54 (2011).
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 324 (1977).
Id. at 325.
Id. at 338,
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
Id.
Id. at 2555-56.
Id. at 2556.
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Mart operated under a policy of discrimination in a manner sufficient to
trigger a certifiable class of over one million women.o
(3) Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust
In Watson, a former employee filed a Title VII suit against a bank,
alleging class-wide racial discrimination.' The district court initially
certified the plaintiff class consisting of "blacks who applied to or were
employed" after October 1979; however, the court later decertified the class
because the class was not based upon a common question of law or fact
uniting them. 92 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, not for the issue of
class certification, but to address employment discrimination claims when
hiring or promotion systems involve "discretionary" or "subjective"
criteria." The Court held that "an employer's policy of leaving promotion
decisions to the unchecked discretion of lower level supervisors should itself
raise no inference of discriminatory conduct."94 Nevertheless, the Court also
held that "subjective or discretionary employment practices may be
analyzed under the disparate impact approach in appropriate cases."95
For a plaintiff class to establish a disparate impact claim, it must identify
the specific employment practice that it is challenging.96 The majority in
Wal-Mart v. Dukes used the holding in Watson to make three conclusions.
First, the plaintiff class did not properly identify a specific employment
practice other than Wal-Mart's system of allowing local managers to make
decisions regarding pay and promotions.97 Second, this system of delegating
authority to local managers does not of itself raise an inference of

90. Id.
91. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,977 (1988).
92. Id. at 983.
93. Id. at 999.
94. Id. at 990.
95. Id. at 990-91 (specifying that an appropriate case for disparate impact analysis is
when "an employer's undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has precisely the
same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination . . . .").
Disparate impact claims, in the Title VII context, are claims brought against an employer for
the employer's "practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
96. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994. The Supreme Court specifically held that in cases involving
subjective decision making criteria and standardized criteria, which is exactly the scenario in
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the burden is upon the plaintiff to isolate and identify the specific
employment practice to be challenged. Id.
97. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011).
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discriminatory conduct.98 Third, because this system is localized and
discretionary, it does not constitute the type of uniform employment
practice that is necessary to establish Rule 23(a)(2) commonality.99
(4) Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof
In establishing the standard for Rule 23(a)(2) commonality, Justice Scalia
used the law review article, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof,
to develop the "common answers" doctrine that is now the standard for
Rule 23(a)(2) commonality. 100 In that article, Professor Richard Nagareda
addressed Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirement that "the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members."o' In Part I of the article, 0 2 Professor Nagareda
discussed how dissimilarities are of critical importance for class certification
under Rule 23.103 In footnote 197 of the article, he expressly noted that Part
I.C was written specifically in the context of Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3).'o
In fact, Professor Nagareda did not reference Rule 23(a)(2) in the entire
article or in any footnotes.' For this reason, the dissent argued that the
98. Id. at 2555.
99. Id. at 2554. Justice Scalia recognizes that discretionary systems can lead to
discrimination under the disparate impact approach, but also asserts that just because a Title
VII claim can exist "does not lead to the conclusion that every employee in a company using
a system of discretion has such a claim in common." Id.
100. Id. at 2551 ("[C]lass certification ... is not the raising of common 'questions'... but,
rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the
potential to impede the generation of common answers.") (quoting Nagareda, supra note 41,
at 132) (emphasis added).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
102. Part I is from where the majority in Dukes derived its rationale for the new
common answers" doctrine. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551; see also Nagareda,supra note 41, at
97.
103. Nagareda, supra note 41, at 150.
104. Id. at 150 n.197; see also id. at 109-133.
105. See, e.g., id. at 97. The entire paragraph from which Scalia derived this new
common answers doctrine was written with Rule 23(b)(3) in mind.
The formulation of Rule 23 in terms of predominant common "questions"and
generally applicable misconduct obscures the crucial line between dissimilarity
and similarity within the class. The existence of common "questions" does not
form the crux of the class certification inquiry, at least not literally, or else the
first-generation case law would have been correct to regard the bare allegations
of the class complaint as dispositive on the certification question. Any
competently crafted class complaint literally raises common "questions." What
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majority's use of this article wrongly imposed a standard for Rule 23(a)(2)
commonality that was based upon an analysis of Rule 23(b)(3) and, as a
result, Rule 23(a)(2) commonality emerged as a much greater hurdle than it
was ever designed to be.o 6 Although these dissenters are correct concerning
the context and misapplication of Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate
Proof, Professor Nagareda has promoted this standard for Rule 23(a)(2)
commonality elsewhere in his writings.o' Thus, while the Supreme Court's
use of the "common answers" doctrine is confusing, it is an accurate
reflection of Professor Nagareda's views on class certification.' 8
b. Rule 23(b)(2) classes and individualized relief
Rule 23(b)(2) states that certification is appropriate "if the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole."' In WalMart v. Dukes, all nine justices"o held that the backpay and punitive
damages sought by the plaintiff class were inappropriate for certification
under a Rule 23(b)(2) class."' The Court held that "[p]ermitting the
combination of individualized and classwide relief in a (b)(2) class
is... inconsistent with the structure of Rule 23(b)"ll 2 and that in "a class
action predominantly for money damages .. . absence of notice and opt-out
violates due process.""' Prior to Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Supreme Court
matters to class certification, however, is not the raising of common
"questions"-even in droves-but, rather, the capacity of a class-wide
proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential
to impede the generation of common answers.
Id. at 131-32 (first emphasis added).
106. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2562, 2565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107. Specifically, the law review article, Common Answers for Class Certification,clearly
articulates the standard Justice Scalia adopts in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, but in the proper Rule
23(a)(2) context. See Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers for Class Certification, 63
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 149, 154 (2010).
108. Compare id., with Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
109. FED. R. Cv. P. 23(b)(2).
110. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
ill. Id. at 2557-58 (majority opinion) ("[Wie think it clear that individualized monetary
claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3).").
112. Id.at2558.
113. Id.at2559.
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"expressed serious doubt about whether claims for monetary relief may be
certified under [Rule 23(b)(2)]."" Now, claims for monetary relief cannot
be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). In reaching this conclusion on
individualized relief, the Court relied on Class Certification in the Age of
Aggregate Proof'" by Professor Nagareda and the Advisory Committee's
Notes for Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'
(1) Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof
The Supreme Court used Professor Nagareda's Class Certification in the
Age of Aggregate Proof to derive the doctrine of "common answers" and to
analyze the merits of individualized damages."' The Court specifically
quoted Professor Nagareda concerning the nature of Rule 23(b)(2) classes;
"The key to the (b)(2) class is 'the indivisible nature of the injunctive or
declaratory remedy warranted-the notion that the conduct is such that it
can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or
as to none of them.""' Because of the nature of Rule 23(b)(2) classes, a
claim for an injunction or a declaratory judgment is only appropriate if it
provides the same relief to each member of the class."' Similarly, monetary
damages in Rule 23(b)(2) classes are inappropriate if they are not the same
across the class but are determined for each member on an individual
basis.'20
(2) Advisory Committee's Note for Rule 23
The Advisory Committee's Note for Rule 23, adopted in 1966, states that
Rule 23(b)(2) "does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief
relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages."'21 Notably, in the
cases cited by the Advisory Committee's Note as examples of Rule 23(b)(2)
114. Id. at 2557 (referring to the Court's opinion in Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511
U.S. 117,121 (1994) (per curiam)).
115. Id. (citing Nagareda, supra note 41, at 132).
116. Id. at 2558 (citing 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966)); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory
committee's note, 1966 Amendment, subdiv. (b)(2) (containing the same language as 39
F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966)).
117. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
118. Id. (quoting Nagareda, supra note 41, at 132).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note, 1966 Amendment, subdiv. (b)(2);
see also 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966) (containing the same language found in the Advisory
Committee's Notes).
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class actions, none of the plaintiffs sought individualized damages.122 Justice
Scalia relied on the Advisory Committee's Note to probe into the history
and original purpose of Rule 23(b)(2) classes.123 The plaintiffs in Wal-Mart
v. Dukes also relied on the Advisory Committee's Note, arguing that their
claims for backpay were appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2) because their
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief predominated over their claims
for backpay.'24 Nevertheless, in light of the procedural protections built into
Rule 23(b)(3) and practical considerations, Justice Scalia rejected the
plaintiff class' claims.' He pointed out that the notice and opt-out
requirements for Rule 23(b)(2) classes are far lower than Rule 23(b)(3)
classes, and there is no proof that class adjudication for money damages in a
Rule 23(b)(2) class is superior to individual adjudications.126 Moreover, he
stated that "[t]he predominance test would ... require the District Court to
reevaluate the roster of class members continually.""
c.

The majority's conclusion in Wal-Mart v. Dukes

In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the plaintiff class could not satisfy the "common
answers" test through Falcon's rationale.128 Thus, the plaintiff class failed to
achieve Rule 23(a)(2) commonality within the context of its Title VII
claim.'29 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia eviscerated the plaintiff
class's three forms of evidence.' Concerning the plaintiff class's statistical
evidence, he stated that "merely proving that the discretionary system has
produced

a... sexual disparity is not enough" to prove a specific

122. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (citing 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966)). Classic examples of early
Rule 23(b)(2) classes are desegregation cases. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory
committee's note, 1966 Amendment, subdiv. (b)(2); 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966) (citing nine
class action cases dealing with segregation issues: "Illustrative are various actions in the civilrights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually
one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration."); see also 35 F.R.D. 317, 338
(1964).
123. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557-58.
124. Id. at 2559 (relying upon a negative reading of the Advisory Committee's Notes to
support their claim for money damages).
125. Id.
126. Id. In fact, Justice Scalia posits that allowing individualized monetary damages in
Rule 23(b)(2) classes will adversely affect individuals in the plaintiff class. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2553.
129. Id. at 2556-57.
130. Id. at 2549, 2553-57.
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discriminatory employment practice as required by the Court."' Next,
Justice Scalia disregarded the employee reports because, even if every
employee report were true, it would "not demonstrate that the entire
company 'operate[s] under a general policy of discrimination."" 32 Finally,
Justice Scalia discredited the expert sociological testimony, stating that it is
"unbelievable that all managers would exercise their discretion in a
common way without some common direction."' The plaintiff class's
evidentiary statistics, employee reports, and expert testimony were not
sufficient in the eyes of the Supreme Court to establish "questions of law or
fact common to the class."'
Furthermore, the plaintiff class erred in seeking punitive and backpay
damages under Rule 23(b)(2).' Under prior Supreme Court jurisprudence
and the overall purpose of Rule 23(b) categories, Rule 23(b)(2) should not
be used to certify a class of 1.5 million women with claims of individualized
monetary relief.136 As Justice Scalia demonstrated, such a certification would
violate due process because of the lower requirements of mandatory
classes.137 Because Rule 23(b)(3) has much higher notice and opt-out
requirements, in addition to the predominance and superiority
requirements, such individualized claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3).138 While
monetary damages are still available in Rule 23(b)(2) classes as long as the
damages are incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief, individualized
damages are never permissible in Rule 23(b)(2) classes. 3 9 Justice Scalia
rejected the plaintiff class's predominance argument, stating that
predominance does not cure the due process issues of insufficient notice
131. Id. at 2555; see also Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (holding
that it is not enough for a plaintiff to simply allege that there is a disparate impact, or point
to a generalized policy; rather, the plaintiff has the burden to isolate and identify the specific
employment practices responsible).
132. Id. at 2556.
133. Id. at 2555 (holding that just because a practice of delegation of authority is uniform
does not mean that all local managers' decisions will be uniform as well). Justice Scalia also
pointed out that Dr. William Bielby could not calculate whether 95 percent or half a percent
of the employment decisions at Wal-Mart were made based on the alleged stereotypes. Id. at
2554.
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
135. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
136. Id. at 2558.
137. Id. at 2559.
138. Id. at 2558.
139. Id. at 2560.

2012]

WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. DUKES

67

and opt-out rights and that courts should not have to continuously
reevaluate the class roster to ensure predominance exists at all times14'
Justice Scalia also rejected the plaintiff class's argument that backpay is
"equitable in nature" by looking to the language of Rule 23(b)(2).14 1 Just
because the rule states that injunctive or declaratory relief is available does
not mean that all forms of equitable relief are up for grabs in a Rule 23(b)(2)
class. 142
2.

Dissenting Opinion in Wal-Mart v. Dukes

Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part.1 13 She asserted that while the class was properly denied on Rule
23(b)(2) grounds, the standard for commonality that the majority adopted
mirrors the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance standard.'" Justice Ginsburg
presupposed that Rule 23(a)(2) commonality is "easily satisfied," 45 basing
this assertion upon the language of the standard itself."' The dissent sided
with the district court on the issue of commonality, finding that the district
court's certification of the class of all female Wal-Mart employees employed
any time after December 26, 1998, was permissible."' Furthermore, the
dissent cited Caifanov. Yamasaki, wherein the Court had noted that "most
issues arising under Rule 23 ... [are] committed in the first instance to the
discretion of the district court."' Justice Ginsburg rebutted the main

140. Id. at 2559.
141. Id. at 2560.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2561-62 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority's
determination that the class failed for Rule 23(b)(2) but disagreed with regard to their Rule
23(a)(2) standard. Id.
144. Id. (alleging that, by holding that the plaintiff class cannot cross the Rule 23(a)(2)
threshold, the majority disqualifies the class at the starting gate).
145. Id. at 2565 (citing 5 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 23.23(2)
(3d ed. 2011)).
146. Id. at 2562 (defining "question of law or fact common to the class" from Rule
23(a)(2) as a "dispute, either of fact or law, the resolution of which will advance the
determination of the class members' claims"). Id.
147. Id.
148. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 703 (1979). It is true that "certification of a
nationwide class, like most issues arising under Rule 23, is committed in the first instance to
the discretion of the district court," as stated by the Supreme Court in 1979. Id. Rule 23(f),
adopted in 1998, also states that matters of class certification may be appealed; thus, the
district court's discretion truly is limited to the first instance. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
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sources that the majority referenced in adopting the "common answers"
standard.'4 9 She also distinguished the majority's use of Falcon by noting
that the plaintiff class in Falcon sought class certification based on one
claim of discrimination by a Mexican-American employee.'s In contrast,
Justice Ginsburg asserted that the employment practices under fire did
touch and concern all 1.5 million potential class members."' Rebutting the
majority's use of Falcon, the dissent quoted from Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, an employment discrimination case decided six years after
Falcon; the dissent stated that, under Watson, a "system of delegated
discretion ... is a practice actionable under Title VII when it produces
discriminatory outcomes.""' The dissent further criticized the majority's
use of Professor Nagareda's Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate
Proof5 " by accurately noting that the context in which Nagareda speaks of
this "common answers" doctrine is Rule 23(b)(3) and not Rule 23(a)(2).'

An order denying certification may confront the plaintiff with a situation in
which the only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final judgment
on the merits of an individual claim that, standing alone, is far smaller than the
costs of litigation. An order granting certification, on the other hand, may force
a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and
run the risk of potentially ruinous liability. These concerns can be met at low
cost by establishing in the court of appeals a discretionary power to grant
interlocutory review in cases that show appeal-worthy certification issues.
Id. advisory committee's note, 1998 Amendment, subdiv. (f).
149. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2565 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the facts of
Falcon from those in present case regarding 23(a)(2) commonality); id. at 2566 (clarifying
that the "dissimilarities" argument derived from Professor Nagareda's article was developed
in the context of Rule 23(b)(3) and not intended to apply as a Rule 23(a)(2) argument).
150. Id. at 2565 n.7 ("[Tlhe only commonality [wa]s that respondent is a MexicanAmerican and he seeks to represent a class of Mexican-Americans." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
151. Id. Justice Ginsburg asserted that the delegation of pay and promotion authority to
subjective local managers is a uniform employment practice across all Wal-Mart stores,
affecting all female Wal-Mart employees and resulting in gender discrimination. See id. at
2563-65.
152. See id. at 2567; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 982, 991
(1988) (noting that discriminatory results of an employer's "discretionary employment
practices" can give rise to Title VII claims if the employer "had not developed precise and
formal criteria for evaluating candidates" and had "relied instead on the subjective judgment
of supervisors").
153. Nagareda, supra, note 41, at 97.
154. See supra Part II.C.1.a (discussing Nagareda's stance on the common answers
doctrine used for Rule 23(a)(2) commonality).
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Justice Ginsburg provided various reasons why the majority misapplied the
Rule 23(a)(2) standard and expressed concern for future litigation relating
to this heightened standard."' Some of those reasons are that Wal-Mart's
pay and promotion practices resulting in discrimination were uniform
throughout their stores;' 6 Wal-Mart operates under a strong "corporate
culture" that influences local managers's decision-making;' the plaintiff
class's anecdotal report suggests Wal-Mart as a whole imposes gender bias
sufficient to satisfy Teamsters; and pay and promotional disparities can
only be explained by gender discrimination."'
III. POTENTIAL ISSUES FROM WAL-MART V. DUKES

There is no doubt that the Supreme Court's holding in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes had and will continue to have an impact on federal class actions.160
From the holding and rationale of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, one can glean at least
four main principles:
(1) Rule 23(a)(2) commonality is not satisfied by the raising of
common questions but by common answers.' 6'
(2) Statistical proof alone is not enough to prove that there are
common answers across a proposed class.16 2

155. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (warning that an imposed Rule
23(b)(3) standard for Rule 23(a)(2) commonality may preclude certain Rule 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2) category classes from being certified). The Third Circuit raised this concern fifteen
years prior to Wal-Mart v. Dukes by stating that establishing a threshold mirroring Rule
23(b)(3) for Rule 23(a)(2) commonality may have repercussions for Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)
class actions not requiring predominance of common questions. See Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3rd Cir. 1996), affd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
156. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2562-63. Contra sources cited supra note 132.
157. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2563. Contra sources cited supra note 133.
158. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2563-64 & n.4. Contrasupra p. 60 and note 90.
159. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2564. Contra id. at 2555 ("Even if they are taken at face value,
these studies are insufficient to establish that respondents' theory can be proved on a
classwide basis.").
160. From its handing down in June 2011 until the end of the year, Wal-Mart v. Dukes
was cited 260 times by the lower courts. See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, LABOR & EMPL'T DEP'T,
ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLAsS ACTION LITIGATION REPORTs 1 (Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. ed. 2012).
161. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551-52.
162. Id. at 2555.
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(3) The Falcon requirement of "rigorous analysis" dictates that
the facts affirmatively prove compliance with Rule 23(a)(1)(4).

(4) Claims for individualizeddamages, including individualized
injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, are not
appropriate for Rule 23(b)(2) classes."*
Consequently, two issues arising from the holding in Wal-Mart v. Dukes
that this Note seeks to clarify are:
(1) Does the heightened standard of requiring the raising of
common answers, not common questions, quash legitimate
class action suits?
(2) How does the ban on individualized relief in Rule 23(b)(2)
classes affect the claim that the "common answers" doctrine
will preclude potentially meritorious class actions?
A. The Common Answers Doctrine
The focus of this Note is on the issue raised by the new commonality
standard of Rule 23(a)(2): does the "common answers" doctrine adopted by
the Supreme Court rein in "blackmail settlements," or does it merely quash
class actions that cannot produce "common answers" in the pretrial stage?
This issue is one of fairness and continues to plague class action litigation.
One of the main reasons we have the different categories of classes under
Rule 23(b) is because the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
sought to balance interests in class litigation and place the appropriate
measures based upon class characteristics, class member notification
required, and relief sought.' 5 The heightened standard of Rule 23(a)(2)
commonality has the potential to affect all future class actions because Rule
23(a)(2) commonality is a requirement for all class action certification.' 66 In
her dissent, Justice Ginsburg states that "because Rule 23(a) is also a
prerequisite for Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) classes, the
Court's ... position is far reaching""' and that the "common answers"

163. Id. at 2551.
164. Id. at 2557.
165. See Mark A. Perry & Rachel S. Brass, Rule 23(b)(2) Certificationof Employment Class
Actions: A Return to FirstPrinciples,65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 681,686 (2010).
166. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
167. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J.dissenting).
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doctrine will potentially bar Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) classes.' 8 This Note
analyzes whether the "common answers" doctrine will have the effect of
precluding only "too big to fail" class actions or whether Justice Ginsburg is
correct that the "common answers" doctrine hinders meritorious Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes. This Note contends that the "common answers"
doctrine will only hinder "too big to fail" classes and not Rule 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2) classes that are otherwise meritorious.
B. The Ban on IndividualizedRelief
Some scholars have posited that additional procedural rules or stricter
interpretation of the existing rules is a viable method to rein in potential
16
Under the ban on individualized relief, as
"blackmail settlements.""
articulated in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, plaintiff classes that previously were
fearless in bringing individualized monetary claims under Rule 23(b)(2) are
now required to seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3).'70 While many
commentators,"' and a few Supreme Court Justices,' 7 2 are incensed over the
heightened standard of Rule 23(a)(2) commonality as articulated in WalMart v. Dukes, the most substantial change to federal class action litigation
is found in the ban on individualized monetary damages in Rule 23(b)(2)

168. Id. Justice Ginsburg refers to the "common answers" doctrine as the "dissimilarities"
analysis. Id.
169. Aaron B. Lauchheimer, Note, A Classless Act[:] The Ninth Circuit's Erroneous Class
Certificationin Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 71 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 533 & 549-50 (2005) (stating
that the addition of Rule 23(f) and a strict interpretation of the Rule 23(a) commonality
requirement are two ways to prevent inequitable class actions).
170. Consequently, these former Rule 23(b)(2) classes must fulfill the higher standards
imposed upon Rule 23(b)(3) classes.
171. Harvey Mars, A Bad Decision, LOCAL 802 NEWS (October 2011),
http://www.local802afm.org/publication-entry.cfm?xEntry=4340460; Andrew Longstreth,
Wal-Mart v. Dukes shakes up employment class actions, REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2012, 7:19 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/10/us-walmart-study-idUSTRE809013201201 10
(stating that Wal-Mart v. Dukes was so pivotal that from now on "[t]here's B.D., Before
Dukes, and A.D., After Dukes"). Contra Scott Hanfling, Wal-Mart Decision Unlikely to Affect
Most Class Action Cases, KFP LAW (June 27, 2011), http://www.kfpsidebar.com/
article_20110627.html ("[A] review of the Court's rationale in this case [regarding Rule
23(a)(2) commonality] reveals that the decision should only affect those purported classes
where the circumstances affecting the class members are only remotely related to one
another." (emphasis added)).
172. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561-62. Specifically, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan disapprove of the Supreme Court's adoption of the "common answers" doctrine. Id.

72

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:49

classes.'17 This Note analyzes the interplay between the "common answers"
doctrine and the ban on individualized monetary relief, and how these rules
will affect future class action litigation.
C. Rule 23(b) Classes Revisited
Before delving into the analysis of these issues, a review of the categories
of class actions is appropriate. Rule 23(b)(1)-(3) states that
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class
members would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual class members that would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members
that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the individual
adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests;
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy."
The requirements of at least one Rule 23(b) category must be satisfied
before a class can be certified in federal court.

173. See infra Part III.C-D.
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)-(3). The factors laid out in Rule 23(b)(3) ("matters pertinent
to . .. findings") have been omitted. See id.
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1. Rule 23(b)(1) Classes
Rule 23(b)(1) classes are classes designed to deal with a particularized
issue where individual adjudications will likely establish incompatible
standards of conduct or where individual adjudications would preclude
non-parties or impair a non-party's ability to protect its interest."' "Rule
23(b)(1) typically does not apply in employment discrimination class
actions."' 76 In general, Rule 23(b)(1) classes are rare'7 ' and by their nature
are inherently capable of class-wide resolution."' Thus, the heightened Rule
23(a)(2) commonality standard as stated in Wal-Mart v. Dukes will not
affect Rule 23(b)(1) classes."' Additionally, the ban on individualized
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). By their nature, Rule 23(b)(1) classes do not have many
issues of Rule 23(a)(2) commonality because the injury at issue is particularized.
176. Daniel F. Piar, The UncertainFuture of Title VII Class Actions After the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REv. 305,310 (2001).
177. Rule 23(b)(1) classes are "relatively rare and . .. typically invoked to resolve competing
claims to a particular piece of property or an identifiable set of proceeds such that a declaration
of one person's rights necessarily resolves the rights of all other members in the class." See
Christopher Chorba et al., Year-End Update on Class Actions. Explosive Growth in Class Actions
Continues Despite Mounting Obstacles to Certification, GIBsoN DUNN (Feb. 10, 2009),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Year-EndUpdateOnClassActions.aspx; see also
7.2 Rule 23 Class Certification Requirements, FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID

ATTORNEYS, http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/42 (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (stating that
"[cilass certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is far more common than (b)(1) classes....").
178. See Perry & Brass, supra note 165, at 686 ("Subdivision (b)(1) captured a defined
subset of cases, such as those involving riparian landowners, security holders, or claimants to
a limited fund, that inherently required class-wide resolution."). Rule 23(a)(2) commonality
is almost a given in Rule 23(b)(1) classes. Rule 23(b)(1)(A) states that a class is appropriate if
"prosecuting separate actions .. . would create a risk of... inconsistent or varying
adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
Commonality is likely present in a class where everyone's claims are so similar that they are
likely to individually bring the same claim against the same party. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) states
that a class is appropriate if "prosecuting separate actions... would create a risk
of... adjudications with respect to individual class members that ... would be dispositive of
the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications . . . ." FED. R.
Clv. P. 23(b)(1)(B). Commonality is likely present in a class where claims are so similar that
they may be potentially precluded under res judicata. See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10,
§ 1763 ("[U]nder Rule 23(b)(1) when a court determines that inconsistent adjudications
might result if individual actions had to be brought, or that the interests of other class
members would be affected by separate actions, in effect it is holding that there is a
substantial overlap in the questions of law or fact presented by the representative action.").
179. The wording of Rule 23(b)(1) is such that by its nature Rule 23(b)(1) classes will
satisfy the "common answers" doctrine as articulated in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. See FED. R. Civ.
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damages in Rule 23(b)(2) classes will not apply to Rule 23(b)(1) classes
because Rule 23(b)(1) classes are outside of the holding of Wal-Mart v.
Dukes.'
2. Rule 23(b)(2) Classes
Rule 23(b)(2) classes, like Rule 23(b)(1) classes, are mandatory classes,
meaning that there is no opt-out requirement."' Rule 23(b)(2) classes are
often called "injunctive" classes because their focus is upon injunctive and
declaratory relief and not monetary relief.1 82 Originally, monetary relief was
not sought under Rule 23(b)(2),18 3 but now monetary relief is available
under Rule 23(b)(2) so long as it is incidental to the injunctive or
declaratory relief sought.'" This change in perspective on monetary
damages has created problems in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions.
When the term "blackmail" is used in reference to class actions, the term
is most likely being used in reference to a large Rule 23(b)(2) class seeking

P. 23(b)(1). If every claimant's claim is so similar that there is a threat that individual
claimants will bring the same action against the same party, class adjudication is likely to
produce "common answers apt to drive resolution of litigation." Nagareda, supra note 41, at
132. Similarly, if a potential claimant needs to be included in an action because her claim is
so similar that she may be precluded under res judicata, "common answers apt to drive
resolution of litigation" abound. Id.
180. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).
181. Rima N. Daniels, Monetary Damages in Mandatory Classes: When Should Opt-Out
Rights Be Allowed?, 57 ALA. L.REv. 499, 503-04 (2005) ("The two so-called mandatory classes
are 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), while the only class where opt-out rights are automatic is 23(b)(3)."
(footnotes omitted)). Because there is no opt-out requirement in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)
classes, there are due process implications. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2558-59 (noting that the
Federal Rules provide "no opportunity for (b)(1) or (b)(2) class members to opt out, and
does not even oblige the District Court to afford them notice of the action."); see also Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (noting that certification of a mandatory class
including money damages potentially compromises the due process rights of individual
claimants).
182. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note, 1966 Amendment, subdiv.
(b)(2); 39 F.R.D. 69,102 (1966).
183. See Perry & Brass, supra note 165, at 696.
184. See Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001); Lemon v. Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 216 F.3d 577, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2000); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,
151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998). One court has held that so long as monetary damages are
not the plaintiff class's "primary purpose," they are permissible. See Molski v. Gleich, 318
F.3d 937, 950 (9th Cir. 2003).

2012]

WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. DUKES

75

money damages not incidental to injunctive or declaratory relief"' In large
part, "blackmail settlements" emerged because Rule 23(b)(2) was never
satisfactorily equipped with protective measures to provide for monetary
relief."
3.

Rule 23(b)(3) Classes

Rule 23(b)(3) classes are the catch-all class and are proper for classes
primarily seeking money damages."' Rule 23(b)(3) requires that "questions
of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members."'" One key feature of the Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance requirement is that predominance of commonality in Rule
23(b)(3) is a much higher standard than Rule 23(a)(2) commonality.' Rule
23(b)(3) also requires that a class action be "superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."9 0 Rule
23(b)(3) is the catch-all class, the class with the most potential for judicial
expansion. That is why the drafters of Rule 23 placed stricter notice and
opt-out requirements upon Rule 23(b)(3), in addition to the predominance
and superiority requirements.' 9' Because of these heightened standards,
many class action attorneys try to avoid Rule 23(b)(3) classes and seek
certification under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2).

185. "Blackmail" settlements traditionally occur in employment discrimination class
actions. Piar, supra note 176, at 314 ("[H]igh damages limits under the 1991 [Title VII] Act
have paved the way for 'blackmail' class actions."). For a list of lucrative employment
discrimination settlements, see sources cited infra note 205.
186. See Perry & Brass, supra note 165, at 694-701 (discussing the history and intended
use of the Rule 23(b)(2) class).
187. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note, 1966 Amendment, subdiv.
(b)(3); 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966); see also Hart,supra note 35, at 816.
188. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added). This is the predominance requirement.
189. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 609 (1997). The Supreme Court held
that "Rule 23(a)(2)'s 'commonality' requirement is subsumed under ... the more stringent
Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that questions common to the class 'predominate over' other
questions." Id. (reasoning that because the class sought to be certified under Rule 23(b)(3),
the court, as a matter of efficiency, need only review whether common questions
predominate because this analysis would address the Rule 23(a)(2) question as well).
190. Id. at 593 (emphasis added). This is the superiority requirement.
191. See Hart, supra note 35, at 816 ("Because 23(b)(3) is a kind of 'catch-all' for more
ambiguous class claims, the Rule imposes a number of additional procedural hurdles on the
23(b)(3) class."). Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are "a growing point in the law" and are
"flexible." See Perry & Brass, supra note 166, at 687.
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Conclusion on the Three Rule 23(b) Classes

The heightened standard for Rule 23(a)(2) commonality under WalMart v. Dukes has potential to hinder classes seeking certification under
Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) but will not hinder classes seeking certification under
Rule 23(b)(3). As a matter of practicality, however, the heightened
commonality standard from Wal-Mart v. Dukes will only affect Rule
23(b)(2) classes; this is because Rule 23(b)(1) classes are rare 92 and by their
nature are inherently capable of class-wide resolution. 93
The ban on individualized relief, as articulated in Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
will only affect Rule 23(b)(2) classes. First, this is because the Court
expressly so narrowed its holding.' Second, Rule 23(b)(1) classes under the
Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp.'" mandatory-class framework are construed more
narrowly because of Rule 23(b)(1) mandatory-class status"' and because
Rule 23(b)(3) classes are specifically for money damages.'9 7

192. Chorba et al., supra note 177 ("Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is far more
common than (b)(1) classes.").
193. See Perry & Brass, supra note 165, at 686 ("Subdivision (b)(1) captured a defined
subset of cases, such as those involving riparian landowners, security holders, or claimants to
a limited fund, that inherently required class-wide resolution.").
194. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) ("Respondents' claims
for backpay were improperly certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).").
Justice Scalia speaks only in Rule 23(b)(2) terms when articulating his ban on individualized
relief. Id.
195. Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
196. The Supreme Court in Ortiz recognizes that Rule 23(b)(1) classes are mandatory
classes in that the potential plaintiffs must become of part of the class or risk being
precluded. Id. at 833.
'[Tihe prosecution of separate actions...would create a risk' of
'adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests.
Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B)).
[M]andatory class actions aggregating damages claims implicate the due
process 'principle of general application in Anglo-American
jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a
litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not
been made a party by service of process. . . .'
Id. at 846 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
197. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2558 ("[Wle think it clear that individualized monetary claims
belong in Rule 23(b)(3)."). There is "at least a substantial possibility" that "actions seeking
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D. The ClassesMost Likely to Be Affected by Wal-Mart v. Dukes
At face value, the types of class actions most likely to be affected by the
holding in Wal-Mart v. Dukes are those classes seeking certification under
Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2). 9 s According to research performed after the
adoption of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, the bulk of all federal
class actions are filed for labor, securities, torts, consumer fraud, and civil
rights claims.'99 Thus, this Note analyzes Title VII, mass tort, securities,
antitrust, and labor class actions within the scope of the "common answers"
doctrine and the ban on individualized relief as articulated in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes.
1. Title VII Class Actions
Title VII class actions are class actions by employees against their
employers, alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.200 Historically, plaintiff classes in Title VII actions sought
certification under Rule 23(b)(2). 2 o' The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded
appropriate remedies to include compensatory and punitive damages to
victims of intentional discrimination and also invoked the right to a jury
trial.2 02 Certain Title VII class actions brought by the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") are not governed by Rule

monetary damages... can be certified only under Rule 23(b)(3)... and not under Rules
23(b)(1) and (b)(2), which do not." Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994).
198. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Because Rule 23(a) is also a
prerequisite for Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) classes, the Court's 'dissimilarities' position
is far reaching. Individual differences should not bar a Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2)
class....").
199. See Emery G. Lee & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action FairnessAct of
2005 on the Federal Courts, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (Apr. 2008), http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa04O8.pdf/$file/cafa408.pdf, Kenneth Jost, Will the Supreme Court Approve
the Wal-Mart Case?, CLASS AcrioN LAWSUITs, http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/
document.php?id=cqresrre20l1051300 (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
201. This is because the original Title VII provided only for remedies in equity, when Title
VII was amended in 1991, however, it added the right to sue for emotional distress and punitive
damage awards. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); see also
Brian Van Vleck, 2(b) or Not 2(b)?: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Closes the Gap Between Class
Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), CALIFORNIA LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT DEFENSE
BLOG (June 24, 2011), http://www.vtzlawblog.com/2011/06/articles/ class-actions/2b-or-not-2bdukes-v-walmart-closes-the-gap-between-class-certification-under-rule-23b2-and-b3/.
202. Piar, supra note 176, at 305.
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23.20 These EEOC "pattern" or "practice" lawsuits are governed by Title VII
and are required to follow the Teamsters framework. 2 ' EEOC actions are
not affected by the commonality standard as articulated in Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, but other Title VII plaintiff classes, like the class spearheaded by
Betty Dukes, are.
Title VII class actions are a great method of legal recourse for those with
legitimate claims of discrimination, but they have also proven to be a quick
ticket to settlement windfalls against major corporations. 205 Title VII class
actions generally seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and can be difficult
in the certification stage because the alleged employer discrimination injury
is more subjective and difficult to quantify on a class-wide basis than
financial injury (e.g., antitrust violations) or physical injury (e.g., a plane
crash). 206 Like many class actions, once certification is achieved, the
defendants have more motivation to settle the case." When dealing with a
large-scale subjective harm, a defendant is very likely to settle to avoid the
costly litigation pursuant to class certification, even if the plaintiffs' claims
are less meritorious.2 08
Wal-Mart v. Dukes states two means of approaching Rule 23(a)(2)
commonality in Title VII cases. The first is the "common answers" doctrine
that applies to all class actions. 209 The second standard for Rule 23(a)(2)
commonality, supplementing only Title VII class actions, is that claimants
must present "significant proof' of any alleged "general policy of
203. SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, supra note 160, at 34.

204. Id.
205. See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, DEFENSE OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS 369, 371 (Oct.
2001) (stating three examples of gender discrimination class action settlements: Lucky Stores,
$107.25 million; Home Depot, $87.5 million; Publix, $81.5 million); Aiello v. Novartis
Pharm. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 2d 89, 92 n.1 (D.D.C. 2010).
206. Phillips v. Hunter Trails Cmty. Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Injuries
[for mental and emotional distress] are by their nature difficult to prove."); Hobson v.
George Humphreys, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 344, 353 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) ("[It is difficult to
measure emotional and mental distress in monetary terms.").
207. Chorba et al., supra note 178 (stating that 89% of certified class actions settle).
208. Id.; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (recognizing
that even a small chance of a devastating loss pressures defendants into settling questionable
claims).
209. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) ("[Cllass
certification... is not the raising of common 'questions'... but, rather the capacity of a
classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to impede the
generation of common answers.").
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discrimination," and show that the policy discriminates on a class-wide
basis. 210 This second standard for commonality provides clarity on how to
achieve Rule 23(a)(2) commonality in Title VII cases and appears to be the
Supreme Court's way of "giving teeth" to the Rule 23 class action
requirements in Title VII cases.21'
When applied to Title VII class actions, the "common answers" doctrine
for Rule 23(a)(2) commonality will not hinder Title VII actions, regardless
of whether they seek to be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). First, the
"common answers" doctrine does not hinder (b)(2) Title VII classes
because the requirements of commonality within a Title VII class are clearly
laid out in Falcon.212 If a class meets either of the standards set forth in
Falcon, then it fulfills Rule 23(a)(2)-the class will present a common
answer apt to drive the resolution of the litigation. Second, if the Title VII
action primarily seeks individualized relief, the class will need to seek
certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Therefore, the "common answers"
doctrine does not hinder Title VII class certification under (b)(3) because
the standard of commonality predominance in (b)(3) classes is higher than
even the "common answers" doctrine.
2.

Mass Tort Class Actions

A mass tort is any tort that occurs on a large scale so that there are many
potential litigants. 213 Rule 23(b)(2) applies to matters "involving injunctive
or declaratory relief, and will seldom, if ever, apply to a mass disaster
case."214 The result of a mass tort is mass injury-consequently, monetary
compensation is the primary objective of mass tort litigation. 21 5 Because

210. Id. at 2553. "[S]ignificant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of
discrimination conceivably could justify a class of both applicants and employees if the
discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion practices in the same general
fashion, such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking processes." Id.
211. John R. Wester et al. Commonality in Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 33
CLASS ACTION REP. 1 (2012). "A prominent treatise had previously found that commonality
is 'easily satisfied."' Id. at n.7 (citing 5 JAMES WM.MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 23.23(2) (3d ed. 2011)).

212. See supra Part II.C.1.a.(1).
213. A mass tort is defined as "[a] civil wrong that injures many people." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1626 (9th ed. 2009). Some of the most popular mass tort lawsuits concern
asbestos/mesothelioma, whose advertisements animate television.
214. 27 AM. JUR. Trials 485 (1980).

215. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1355 (1995).
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money is the primary objective of mass tort claims, generally these claims
should be certified under Rule 23(b)(3). Raising the commonality standard,
as done in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, does not hinder a class seeking to be certified
under Rule 23(b)(3) because the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement is
subsumed under the requirement that common questions predominate.
3. Securities Class Actions
Simply defined, a security is an investment contract.2 16 Securities fraud is
governed by Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
occurs when any manipulative or deceptive device is implemented during
the purchase or sale of any security."' Securities class actions are certified
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b). 218 As one scholar put
it, "Securities class actions proceed with the objective of permitting those
separated wrongfully from their wealth to get some of it back."21 9 Because
money is the emphasis of securities actions, such actions are generally
certified as a Rule 23(b)(3) class.220 Being brought under Rule 23(b)(3), the
"common answers" doctrine of Wal-Mart v. Dukes does not significantly
hinder potential securities class actions, and the Rule 23(a)(2) standard for
commonality does not pose a threat of non-certification. The ban on
individualized monetary damages for Rule 23(b)(2) classes will not affect
securities actions because they are certified under Rule 23(b)(3) and not
(b)(2).221

216. See S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946).
217. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318 (2007).
218. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2183 (2011); In re DVI,
Inc. Securities Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 629 (3d Cir. 2011); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368
F.3d 356, 363 (4th Cir. 2004).
219. James D. Cox, Making Securities FraudClass Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIz. L.REv. 497,
497 (1997).
220. Kermit Roosevelt III, Defeating Class Certification in Securities Fraud Actions, 22
REv. LITIG. 405, 407 (2003) (stating that a survey on class actions in four federal districts
found that a "(b)(3) class was certified in 94% to 100% of the securities cases...." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
221. Robert H. Bell & Thomas G. Haskins, Jr., The Effects of Wal-Mart v. Dukes on Class
Certification, AM. BAR AsS'N (January 31, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
committees/securities/email/winter20l2/winter2Ol2-wal-mart-dukes-initial-effects
securities-fraud-class-certification.html (stating that the ban on individualized monetary
damages "is less readily applicable to securities-fraud class actions, which seek monetary
relief and certification under Rule 23(b)(3).").
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4. Antitrust Class Actions
Antitrust law is the law governing business competition and
monopolies.222 Antitrust litigation derives its power from the Sherman
Antitrust Act 22 3 and the Clayton Antitrust Act. 22 4 The Clayton Act was
enacted to supplement the Sherman Act225 and expand the jurisdictional
options for obtaining relief to those injured by antitrust violations.2 26
Antitrust violations are ripe for class action because, in many cases, price
fixing affects large numbers of people and, while individual damages are
minor, collective damages are severe.227
In antitrust litigation, defendants are jointly and severally liable for all
damages caused by anticompetitive conduct.2 Therefore, once a class is
certified, the defendants generally choose to settle rather than risk having
massive damages awarded to the plaintiff class. 229 Because antitrust class
actions are brought on behalf of consumers who have been economically
damaged, antitrust class actions are almost never certified through Rule

222. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); see also Gordon v. N.Y. Stock
Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
223. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006). Section one of the Sherman Act states, "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id. § 1.
224. Id. §§ 12-27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2006). Fifteen U.S.C. § 15 states that
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States .. . without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
225. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957); Allen
Bradley Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 803 (1945); Standard Fashion Co. v.
Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355 (1922).
226. See United States v. Nat'l City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 579 (1948).
227. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161, 166 (1974) (recognizing that the
plaintiffs' individual claims were $70 and that a class action of thousands of people
collectively is the only way their claims would be worth litigating).
228. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., Inc., 668 F.2d
1014, 1053 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that Plaintiff, Inglis, "was not required to name all of the
alleged conspirators inasmuch as antitrust coconspirators are jointly and severally liable for
all damages caused by the conspiracy").
229. Stanley D. Davis & Kathy Perkins Brooks, The Employment Class Action: Recent
Developments and Ideas for Discussion, 2 SEDONA CONF. J.109, 111 (2001).
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23(b)(1) or (b)(2). 23 0 Because antitrust class actions seek individualized
monetary damages and are certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the "common
answers" doctrine is not a significant hurdle. The Rule 23(a)(2)
commonality inquiry is subsumed under the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
requirement. 231 Additionally, in the 2008 case In re Hydrogen Peroxide, the
Third Circuit held that, in order to achieve certification under Rule
23(b)(3), the plaintiff class must "demonstrate that the [injury] element of
antitrust impact is capable of proof at trial through evidence that is
common to the class rather than [the] individual," 23 2 and that mere " [p] roof
of conspiracy is not proof of common injury. 23 3 The Rule 23(b)(3) standard
of predominance of a common question is more than sufficient to fulfill the
"common answers" doctrine of the Court in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. Because
antitrust class action lawsuits reside in the realm of Rule 23(b)(3), the effect
of Wal-Mart v. Dukes is limited: the heightened standard of commonality
will not preclude any suits that would otherwise pass muster, and the ban
on individualized monetary damages will not affect antitrust classes because
such classes are not certified under Rule 23(b)(2).

230. See David R. Garcia & Leo Caseria, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Implicationsfor Antitrust
Class Actions, SHEPPARDMULLIN (July 11, 2011), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/walmart-v-dukes-implications-antitrust-class-actions; see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156, 163-64 (1974) (stating that Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class certification was
inapplicable for the antitrust class action before the Court); PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE STRATEGIES 149, 177 (July 2004) ("The
great majority of antitrust class actions are certified as 23(b)(3) actions."); Sheldon R.
Shapiro, Annotation, Propriety, Under Rules 23(a) and 23(b) of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, As Amended in 1966, of Class Action for Violation of Federal Antitrust Laws, 6
A.L.R. FED. 19 (1971) (stating that "few antitrust class actions have involved Rule 23(b)(1) or
Rule 23(b)(2)").
231. See Steven Bizarand & Allison Khaskelis, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: A Non-Event for
Antitrust Defendants, 26 ANTITRUST 1 (Fall 2006), available at http://www.bipc.com/files
/Publication/b7al3572-6801-4faO-87bf-7db52174e56flPreview/PublicationAttachment
/62eead5O-33la-4733-9f657e0e877b51a2/Fall11-BizarC.pdf (stating that in most antitrust
class cases, the "action" arises under Rule 23(b)(3)); see also Ellen Meriwether, The "Hazards"
of Dukes: Antitrust Class Action Plaintiffs Need Not Fear the Supreme Court's Decision, 26
ANTITRUST 18 (Fall 2011) ("[Rule 23(a)(2)] commonality is often conceded in antitrust
actions, and the war is waged on the issue of whether the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(3) has been satisfied.").
232. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.30 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2008).
233. Id. (quoting Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 572 (8th Cir. 2005)).
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Labor Class Actions

Labor class actions are the largest category of class actions.234 Outside of
Title VII actions, almost all labor class actions are brought under ERISA,
FLSA, and ADEA violations. 235 ERISA stands for the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act and is a federal law that sets minimum standards for
pension plans in private industry.236 FLSA stands for the Fair Labor
Standards Act and is a federal law that sets minimum standards for wages
and labor conditions that employers must observe.237 While claims under
ERISA must conform to the Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements to be
certified,2 38 FLSA multiple-plaintiff actions, on the other hand, are referred
to as collective actions 239 and are not certified under Rule 23.240 Thus, the
holding of Wal-Mart v. Dukes does not affect labor collective actions under
the FLSA. 24 1 ADEA actions are actions brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.242 Similar to FLSA actions, multipleplaintiff age discrimination claims under the ADEA are not governed by
Rule 23.243
The holding of Wal-Mart v. Dukes has the potential to affect ERISA
claims because these claims are often certified under Rule 23(b)(1),

234. Lee & Willging, supra note 200.
235. Chorba et al., supra note 177 (stating that most labor class actions are brought under
ERISA and FLSA).
236. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
237. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 202, 206 (2006).
238. In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 227 F.R.D. 338, 341-42 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
239. Alvarez v. City of Chi., 605 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2010); Sandoz v. Cingular
Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 919 (5th Cir. 2008); De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d
301, 304 (3d Cir. 2003).
240. See Brian Herrington, Fair Labor StandardsAct Collective Action vs. Rule 23 Class
Action, BARRETT L. GROUP, P.A. (January 15, 2010), http://www.bherringtonlaw.com/2010/
01/fair-labor-standards-act-collective-action-vs-rule-23-class-action/.
241. The governing law in Wal-Mart v. Dukes is Rule 23. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011).
242. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2008) ("It shall be unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual... because of such individual's age.").
243. See SEYFARTH SHAw LLP, supra note 160, at 87; see also Ruehi v. Viacom, Inc., 500
F.3d 375, 379 (3d Cir. 2007) ("The ADEA incorporates the collective action provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act.").
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23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3). 2" There are two things to note, however, regarding
future ERISA class actions under Wal-Mart v. Dukes. First, under the
Court's holding, ERISA classes seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(2)
will likely fail if individualized money damages are a focus of the
litigation;... Rule 23(b)(2) classes seeking individualized damages are now
required to seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3). 2 " By pushing such
money-seeking claims into the Rule 23(b)(3) category, the heightened
standard for Rule 23(a)(2) commonality is not a threat because it is
subsumed under the requirement of commonality predominance. Second,
any Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(3) ERISA actions will not be affected by the ban on
individualized monetary damages in (b)(2) classes because (b)(1) and (b)(3)
classes are not affected by the Court's holdings in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.
Lastly, the "common answers" doctrine will not likely have an adverse
impact on Rule 23(b)(1) ERISA class actions. This is so because Rule
23(b)(1) classes are mandatory classes and because the individuals' claims
are so similar that they must form a single class or otherwise forfeit their
claims because of res judicata."
IV. CONCLUSION

The "common answers" doctrine will not hinder meritorious Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes. Because of the limitations Ortiz places on Rule
23(b)(1) classes24 8 and the limitations Wal-Mart v. Dukes places on

244. See Piazza v. EBSCO Indus., Inc., 273 F.3d 1341, 1352 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that
claims brought under ERISA section 502(a)(2) are usually certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or
(2)).
245. In settlements of ERISA class actions, the terms typically include monetary
payments and additional injunctive orders barring fiduciaries and third parties from certain
actions. SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, supra note 161, at 13.
246. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (holding that individualized relief, including monetary
relief, is no longer appropriate within a Rule 23(b)(2) class); SEYFARTH SHAw LLP, supra note
160, at 6.
247. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 1763 ("[U]nder Rule 23(b)(1) when a court
determines that inconsistent adjudications might result if individual actions had to be
brought, or that the interests of other class members would be affected by separate actions, in
effect it is holding that there is a substantial overlap in the questions of law or of fact
presented by the representative action.").
248. See Perry & Brass, supra note 165, at 692 (discussing how Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp.
poses limitations on Rule 23(b)(1) classes because it is a mandatory provision and as such it
"must be carefully applied to ensure that the procedural class action device does not
transgress the rights of either the defendant or the absent class members").
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individualized relief within Rule 23(b)(2) classes,249 the effect is that Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes will not experience difficulty fulfilling the
common answers" doctrine.
Furthermore, classes seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(1) will not be
adversely affected by the "common answers" doctrine adopted by the Court
in Wal-Mart v. Dukes because Rule 23(b)(1) classes by their nature pose
common questions with common answers apt to resolve the litigation.2 50
Additionally, any class seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3) will not be
adversely affected by the "common answers" doctrine adopted by the Court
in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.2 51 For categories of class actions like securities,
antitrust, and products liability that seek money damages, Rule 23(a)(2)
poses the smallest commonality problem.2 52 Any class primarily seeking
money damages need not fear Rule 23(a)(2) commonality because Rule
23(b)(3) predominance will most likely be the deal-breaker.2 53
The "common answers" doctrine has the greatest potential to affect
employment class litigation. Since large employment class actions have the
potential to bankrupt employers, many employers settle once a class is
certified, regardless of the merits of the case. Employment class actions
brought by classes sometimes seem to adopt a "the more the merrier"
approach to class litigation. This approach makes the classes greatly
formidable-almost "too big to fail." Employment classes are almost always
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because Rule 23(b)(2) classes are particularly
well-suited for constantly shifting populations.2 " Good examples of classes
with shifting populations are prisons, student bodies, and workforces. Rule
23(b)(2) classes are well-suited for shifting populations because Rule

249. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
250. See Chorba et al., supra note 177; see also supra pp. 72-73 and text accompanying
note 177 (analyzing Rule 23(b)(1)).
251. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 609 (1997). The Supreme Court held
that "Rule 23(a)(2)'s 'commonality' requirement is subsumed under ... the more stringent
Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that questions common to the class 'predominate over' other
questions." Id. (reasoning that because the class sought to be certified under Rule 23(b)(3),
the court, as a matter of efficiency, need only review whether common questions
predominate because this analysis would address the Rule 23(a)(2) question as well).
252. Rule 23(b)(3) is the more stringent commonality standard that these class actions
will be required to prove.
253. See supra Part III.C.3.
254. WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., RUTTER GROUP, CAL. PRAc. GUIDE FED. CIV. PRO.
BEFORE TRIAL ch. 10-C, § 10:405.1 (2012).
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23(b)(2) relief is limited to injunctive or declaratory relief 255 Money
damages are not suitable claims for these shifting populations because the
determination of damages owed on an individual basis to a shifting
population is very difficult to calculate and would likely breed claims of
fraud and due process violations.
The Supreme Court was justified in narrowing the scope of Rule 23(a)(2)
commonality because the only type of classes that struggle with
commonality are the same type of classes notorious for "blackmail"
settlements-Rule 23(b)(2) classes. Similarly, the Supreme Court was
justified in shifting individualized monetary damages from Rule 23(b)(2)
classes to Rule 23(b)(3) classes, where due process can be better accorded.
While the dissent was justified in its concern over preclusion of meritorious
Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes through the "common answers" doctrine,
such concerns are unlikely to come to fruition because of how the ban on
individualized relief interfaces with the characteristics of Rule 23(b) classes.
Taken at face value, Wal-Mart v. Dukes appears to be a watershed case that
completely revamps Rule 23 and remands sex discrimination litigation back
to the dark ages. When analyzed, however, what is revealed is a precedent
that successfully tames "too big to fail" classes aimed at blackmailing
defendants with deep pockets, but, at the same time, does not prevent
meritorious classes from having their bite at the apple.

255. Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 142 (3rd Cir. 1998) (noting that Rule 23
(b)(2) classes were "designed... for civil rights cases seeking broad declaratory or injunctive
relief for a numerous and often unascertainable or amorphous class of persons.").

